More Iran

This is just a short bit on the mainstream criticism of the recent Iranian nuclear deal. Most of the points I raised several months ago are still valid, and I won’t be bringing them back up.

As President Obama touched on in his Q&A on Wednesday; most of the critics do not seem to be taking a long-term view of these negotiations or the deal. Those that can see past their own egos are approaching the situation from a view that Iran will act in a similar fashion to the DPRK and renege on its agreements as soon as it has received some minor benefit. My assessment (and apparently that of the rest of the western world), is that Iran will act rationally.

The Iranian government has every reason to wish to interact with the rest of the world in a positive economic fashion. Iran has considerable mineral/oil wealth, as well as a robust technology industry [1]. Because a significant portion of the Iranian economy depends on being able to interact with the rest of the world, the international sanctions placed on them were particularly effective. Unlike the DPRK, where isolation is the status quo, the Iranian people rejected the hardliners and elected Rowhani, who campaigned on fixing the economy through negotiation to remove sanctions. The Iranian people place the blame for the sanctions and economic damage not on the west, but on the actions of their government, and the election results showed that. Barring a dramatic shift in that attitude, there is no logical reason for a moderate president (or a supreme leader who wishes to stay in power) to act irrationally after the agreement is in place.

There has been some legitimate criticism based on the vague wording of the final agreement; the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) [a] has raised concerns that the Iranians might be able to hold on to some of their LEU stockpile by holding it in oxides. [2] This would fundamentally change the agreement, which is based on Iran holding 300 kg of LEU (barely a 3^rd of a bomb). As I read their logic, this comes from a hypothetical bending of the agreement to avoid declaring Iranian non-compliance after technical difficulties. While this is a bit of a leap, ISIS certainly has the credentials to make that leap, and their logic has been backed by other nuclear policy experts. [3]

This puts us in a situation where there are technical points and counterpoints; for example, does the inspection regime protect from Iran holding/using a larger stockpile? Is Kuperman right in asserting that the Iranians only need 8kg of WGU to make a warhead? These are questions that need to be discussed and answered as congress prepares to vote on the agreement; however I have yet to see a single critic or reporter raise these points.

There are several possibilities for why it hasn’t been brought up. One is that most of the information the US has on Iran’s actual ability to convert Uranium oxides into LEU/WGU is highly classified. In preliminary briefings, US Senators and Representatives may have been told as such and are not discussing it publicly. There are some flaws in that scenario, the biggest being hat there are think-tanks writing about the issue, and I was able to do research on the topic, and I don’t have any kind of security clearance. What is most likely the real reason for the lack of discussion is that complex nuclear security issues do not translate well to sound bites.

It’s unfortunate, but I feel that the thought process of most of these politicians is “gee wiz how do I get the most emotional response from the voters? Can I get a more emotional response than Ted Cruz?” [b]. Claiming Armageddon is on the way elicits an emotional response, far more so than any kind of discussion that makes people think about high school chemistry. Problem: you can’t have a serious discussion about nuclear weapons programs without talking about a lot of very advanced chemistry, physics and engineering. Anything else is a silly side-show. The fact that most American (and Israeli) politicians and media outlets seem to insist on running on with said side-show is depressing. Even Obama’s Q&A session was annoyingly simple – plainly dumbed down to make sure nobody felt left behind.

My advice to those involved in the debate would be to avoid that. Don’t dumb down your material to suit the audience. Educate your audience to understand the materiel. This is a complex topic, and it does not get easier simply because you don’t understand it. Forming an opinion on something you don’t understand is dishonest. Legislating on that opinion is plainly irresponsible, and that’s if nuclear weapons aren’t involved.   

[1] http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2012-03/05/iranian-concrete

[2] http://www.isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Controversy_Irans_Newly_Produced_LEU_3Jul2015-final.pdf

[3] http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/23/opinion/the-iran-deals-fatal-flaw.html

[a] Not to be confused with the International Secret Intelligence Service

[b] Was originally Donald Trump, but I really don’t like giving him attention…dammit

A Short Bit on the Iran Deal...

So I finally had a chance to read the full text of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and I’m honestly shocked at how reasonable it is. In retrospect, I wish that I had mocked Netanyahu harder for his reaction to it. The language used, as well as the conditions for sanction removal and the sanctions that will remain in place are heavily slanted towards the West. If Iran agrees to the framework and Congress doesn’t demolish it, Obama may finally have a foreign policy legacy.

First off, reductions in centrifuges and uranium stockpiles are significant. A reduction of 97% of the Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) stockpile to 300kg is a massive reduction, something far greater than I had anticipated. The stockpile size is enough to use for some research, and probably enough to start a civilian program, but not enough to actually develop a nuclear weapons program. The fact that Iran is willing to give up this much surprises me. Furthermore, the reduction in centrifuges is also significant (66%), but what is even more limiting is the restrictions on using only first-generation centrifuges. These first-generation centrifuges (IR-1s) are old, copy-of-Pakistani-copy-of-Dutch designs that are known to have high breakdown rates. In recent years the efficiency of these centrifuges has faltered, with possible reasons ranging from lingering Stuxnet damage to simple age. While the agreed-upon quantity of centrifuges is more than enough to exceed the LEU stockpile limit, it is not enough to create LEU at the rates and quantities required for serious commercial production, let alone a weapons program. [2] If they were using the later-generation centrifuges, this would be a concern, but later sections of the JCPOA provide coverage from this.

Secondly, the language used in the inspections and access section of the JCPOA means that access to Iran’s nuclear facilities can be conducted at the IAEA’s whim, denying Iran the ability to simply move a weapons program around scheduled inspections. Scheduled inspections are how Israel hid it’s nuclear weapons program in the 60’s, and likely part of how Iran tried to hid it’s program circa 2006. The JCPOA uses the phrase “Inspectors will have continuous surveillance…” which to me indicates that the IAEA cannot be denied access to centrifuges, which allows verification of the restrictions placed on centrifuge use. The continuous surveillance stipulation also applies to the entire centrifuge manufacturing base, as well as all centrifuges removed from enrichment facilities. What that tells me is that there is significant monitoring on Iran’s enrichment capabilities, meaning that regardless of the breakout time, the chances of the international community learning about it earlier are much higher. Further, the framework agrees to give inspectors access to suspicious sites or locations where a covert site might be, with no restrictions.

Thirdly, from a military standpoint, the JCPOA also proposes removal of all enrichment equipment from the Qom (Fordow) enrichment facility. This was the covert facility that was publicly revealed in 2009, and was the site for the higher enrichment of uranium (up to 19.75%). [3] Literally built under a mountain, Fordow represented a significantly harder target than most of the other nuclear facilities in Iran. Moving enrichment from Fordow makes the program far more vulnerable to a military strike.

Finally, the framework’s plan for removal of sanctions is extremely cautious. The removal of sanctions requires the IAEA to first have validated that Iran has taken the key nuclear-related steps. The US sanctions will be lifted but not removed, allowing them to “snap-back” in the event of Iranian non-compliance. UNSC sanctions will be removed, but other UN restrictions will be moved into a new UNSC resolution to include the same transparency and technology transfer measures. From the US side, the sanctions placed on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses and ballistic missiles will remain in place, and there is no guarantee that the US will not add more (although that would probably be non-conductive to Iran agreeing to this…).

I’m not sure where the controversy on this framework comes from. The only alternatives I’ve seen have been Israel’s insistence on Iran’s complete capitulation (clearly forgetting the NPT exists), or people like John Bolton insisting that bombing Iran would be a walk in the park (I beg to differ [4]). Provided the final agreement does not alter the agreed-upon technology limits and inspection authorization too much, this deal is a phenomenal win for the west. It will cripple Iran’s ability to enrich uranium to weapons grade, and provide robust surveillance for at least the next quarter-century. If successful, it will avert a nuclear arms race in the gulf region and successfully preserve the global non-proliferation regime.

[1] http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/text-agreement-iran-nuclear-program-30079073?singlePage=true

[2] http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/IR1_Centrifuge_Performance_18October2011.pdf

[3] http://www.isisnucleariran.org/sites/detail/fordow/

[4] http://csis.org/files/publication/120906_Iran_US_Preventive_Strikes.pdf

F-35 Close Air Support

By: A snarky college student who plays far too much Command

It’s worth noting that I have no military experience what-so-ever and this commentary is simply me rambling about what I see as a dumb reaction on the part of many. I’ll try and keep everything sourced as best I can, and I am always open to corrections.

So I have a simulator called Command: Modern Air Naval Operations, which has been described by the US Naval Institute as “near accurate model of hypothetical war with China as can be had using unclassified means”. The sim covers far more than China, and you could probably argue that it is a great model for any conflict. As anyone who plays it will tell you, F-35’s are pretty awesome.

Wait, what?

Yep, F-35’s are incredible force multipliers as modeled in the simulator, and that’s with unclassified documentation.

But the F-35 can’t accelerate!

It keeps up with most 4th gen aircraft.

It can’t turn!

See above.

VHF Radars can detect it!

Well, they can detect it, but VHF radars simply can’t generate a fire-control quality track, due to the wavelengths. So REDFOR might know where the F-35 is, but if they can’t put weapons on it, the kill chain is broken, and stealth has served it’s purpose.

It can’t do CAS!

And here’s what I want to address most in depth.

There seems to be a huge debate over whether or not the A-10 can be effectively replaced by “fast-movers” such as the F-35 in the future. One camp seems to side with the current Department of Defense administration in agreeing that it’s time to move toward more multi-mission platforms. The opposing camp seems to be mostly dedicated to keeping the A-10 in service for a variety of reasons. Some of those reasons seem to be nostalgic (Remember when F-14’s got parked back in 2005?), and others seem to come from infantrymen arguing that the A-10 is the CAS aircraft (Although when retired flag officers dispute that, I’ll take it with a grain of salt). Others still base it on the technical rigors of the CAS mission, and that’s what I want to talk about (Since, you know, sources).

I have seen it argued that the A-10 is a vastly more survivable airplane, due to it’s ability to take an exceptionally large amount of battle damage. [Comments][2][3] This is actually one of the best features of the A-10, especially when operating in a low-threat environment such as our current conflicts in the Middle East and Afghanistan. In these environments, the biggest threats have generally been scattered MANPADs and possibly some AAA emplacements/vehicles. In the role the A-10 was designed for, killing Soviet tanks in Germany, in a full scale war it was expected that over 2 weeks the A-10 fleet would be basically eliminated. [4] While the Warthog would account for a massive chunk of a Soviet Armored invasion, the planes and pilots would take grievous losses. This threat assessment also predates the development of more advanced SAMs (SA-15/-16/-17/-19) that would move with an armored column. It also predates the widespread availability of Look-Down/Shoot-Down radars (The Su-27/MiG-31 were mostly used by PVO in the 1980’s, and the early versions of the MiG-29 had terrible low altitude radar performance [5]). It can therefore be assumed that, in an open conflict with a near-peer foe (Russia or PRC), the A-10 would take the same, if not heavier losses.

The extent of these losses likely results from the A-10’s expected mission profile. It was expected to be low, slow (relatively) and over the FEBA for most of its mission. This profile results in significant exposure to ground fire. The A-10 was built to survive (somewhat) in this environment, and it is able to shrug off a significant amount of AAA and make it home after taking a MANPAD. These are features that the F-35 lacks. However, I would argue that in a current near-peer threat environment, if a CAS aircraft is exposed to the point where REDFOR can put weapons on it, it will rapidly exceed the A-10’s ability to receive damage. In these cases, it is best to reduce exposure time to an absolute minimum. As noted by Caygill, it has been shown that when dealing with SHORAD, the best combination is high speed combined with low altitude [6, p. 86]. This is the case for the idea of “one pass and haul ass” – put weapons on target and escape to preserve the platform for future strikes.

There is a significant problem with operating at high speed and low altitude, and that is one of target acquisition. When flying, it can sometimes be hard to pick up point targets when flying a Cessna 172 at 100 knots as opposed to flying a fighter at 400 knots at <500 feet. For operations in low-threat environments, the A-10 has an advantage in that it can fly low and slow(er) and do so for longer than any other fixed-wing CAS aircraft. This will change with the introduction of the F-35 and it’s Electro Optical Targeting System/Distributed Aperture System (EOTS/DAS). Recent trials by the USAF Air Warfare Center have shown that because the F-35 has the ability to acquire and put weapons on targets in a time frame that exceeds 4th generation fighters by minutes. [7] That may not sound like much, but when bullets are flying, that’s a significant amount of time. The ability of the F-35 to integrated multiple sources of information will likely also reduce the number of Blue-on-Blue incidents, as the F-35 pilots will have greater information as to the location of friendly forces. Most unclassified info seems to indicate that the F-35 should be able to detect and identify ground targets with an unparalleled efficiency; interviews with General Hostage (Head of ACC) and videos put out by contractors tell a story of being able to see, well, everything. [8] This gives the F-35 the ability to effectively execute “one pass and haul ass” against point targets/vehicles, effectively giving it the best of both worlds.

The F-35’s armament in these situations isn’t shabby either. As suggested by the Air Warfare Center, on the first day of the war, the F-35 would want to preserve it’s LO features and would be restricted to internal carriage of munitions. [7] Upon its entry into service, the GBU-53 Small Diameter Bomb II will offer an anti-armor weapon that can be carried internally in operationally significant numbers. The F-35 can carry 8 GBU-53’s internally, giving it a respectable load while maintaining stealth and maintaining stand-off distance to minimize exposure to REDFOR air defenses. [9] For international operators, the Brimstone II missile will also offer similar capabilities (with fewer seeker options). The F-35 likely will not ever have the ability the A-10 does to rapidly return to a target area, however, meaning that overall the number of weapons the same number of airplanes can put on target is lower for the F-35. Since I don’t have access to studies that evaluate the survivability of the F-35, I can’t take a guess as to a project loss rate to determine if fewer sorties over a longer time balances out with more sorties over a shorter time.

Loiter time is another area where the A-10 reportedly has a massive advantage over the F-35 in any kind of CAS scenario. The A-10, as per the unclassified flight manual, will not have more than an hour of combat time after a 150 nm transit. For loiter time at 15,000 feet, it could theoretically about 2 and a half hours of endurance. [10] For the F-35, we don’t have unclassified flight performance data, but we do know it’s listed combat radius (~600 nm) and can make a decent guess as to it’s cruise speed (450 knots). [11] That gives a best guess as to about 1.5 hours out and back, for 3 hours of total mission fuel with reserves. The F-35 can then theoretically make the same 150 nm transit in 20 minutes, leaving it 2 hours and 40 minutes of mission fuel, over the same target! As you extend the operating radius further out, the time overhead will decrease, and I can only guess that because F-35 missions are supposed to take place further from the FEBA, the listed loiter time is lower, leading to the confusion. It’s generally forgotten that the F-35 can carry a lot of internal fuel (more than double the F-16). [12]

To deal with low-intensity operations like those of the past decade, the most cost effective method will likely be to transition towards some kind of combined ISR/Light Attack asset. This could either take the place of use of unmanned assets in a more tactical role or to make more use of armed turboprops. For light attack, the Embraer Super Tucano or Pilatus PC-21 are frequently mentioned, yet there is little chance the US military will purchase either for this role. The USMC has recently begun placing Griffin missiles in the rear of some of it’s C-130s to provide a persistent light attack platform.

To wrap it up, I want to end with what I consider the best overall argument that the F-35 can probably do CAS fairly well; the fact that the USMC is still in favor of the program. The Marines, in general, are the service that seems to be the most about combined arms in direct support of ground forces. They generally seem to be positive about how successful the F-35B will be at replacing the AV-8B. The Harrier has an unparalleled ability to take off from forward bases, attack targets, rearm, and then hit targets again, and again, and again. If the Harrier can be replaced, the CAS mission can clearly be covered, since there is no other way to describe the Harrier’s mission.


[2] http://breakingdefense.com/2014/11/ayotte-to-air-force-f-35s-mechanics-shortage-false-choice/

[3] http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/lists/posts/post.aspx?ID=1570

[4] http://www.warisboring.com/2013/01/21/life-expectancy-of-a-cold-war-a-10-pilot/

[5] http://toad-design.com/migalley/index.php/jet-aircraft/mig29/mig29-n019-radar/

[6] Flying the Buccaneer, Peter Caygill, 2008

[7] http://intercepts.defensenews.com/2014/12/a-look-at-f-35-close-air-support-tactics-development/

[8] http://breakingdefense.com/2014/06/a-gods-eye-view-of-the-battlefield-gen-hostage-on-the-f-35/

[9] http://www.airforce-technology.com/news/newsraytheon-small-diameter-bomb-ii-usaf

[10] http://www.avialogs.com/viewer/avialogs-documentviewer.php?id=3298

[11] http://defensetech.org/2011/05/13/f-35a-combat-radius-fails-to-meet-minimum-requirement/

[12] http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/22/F-35_A_B_C_Config.png/800px-F-35_A_B_C_Config.png