So I finally had a chance to read the full text of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and I’m honestly shocked at how reasonable it is. In retrospect, I wish that I had mocked Netanyahu harder for his reaction to it. The language used, as well as the conditions for sanction removal and the sanctions that will remain in place are heavily slanted towards the West. If Iran agrees to the framework and Congress doesn’t demolish it, Obama may finally have a foreign policy legacy.
First off, reductions in centrifuges and uranium stockpiles are significant. A reduction of 97% of the Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) stockpile to 300kg is a massive reduction, something far greater than I had anticipated. The stockpile size is enough to use for some research, and probably enough to start a civilian program, but not enough to actually develop a nuclear weapons program. The fact that Iran is willing to give up this much surprises me. Furthermore, the reduction in centrifuges is also significant (66%), but what is even more limiting is the restrictions on using only first-generation centrifuges. These first-generation centrifuges (IR-1s) are old, copy-of-Pakistani-copy-of-Dutch designs that are known to have high breakdown rates. In recent years the efficiency of these centrifuges has faltered, with possible reasons ranging from lingering Stuxnet damage to simple age. While the agreed-upon quantity of centrifuges is more than enough to exceed the LEU stockpile limit, it is not enough to create LEU at the rates and quantities required for serious commercial production, let alone a weapons program. [2] If they were using the later-generation centrifuges, this would be a concern, but later sections of the JCPOA provide coverage from this.
Secondly, the language used in the inspections and access section of the JCPOA means that access to Iran’s nuclear facilities can be conducted at the IAEA’s whim, denying Iran the ability to simply move a weapons program around scheduled inspections. Scheduled inspections are how Israel hid it’s nuclear weapons program in the 60’s, and likely part of how Iran tried to hid it’s program circa 2006. The JCPOA uses the phrase “Inspectors will have continuous surveillance…” which to me indicates that the IAEA cannot be denied access to centrifuges, which allows verification of the restrictions placed on centrifuge use. The continuous surveillance stipulation also applies to the entire centrifuge manufacturing base, as well as all centrifuges removed from enrichment facilities. What that tells me is that there is significant monitoring on Iran’s enrichment capabilities, meaning that regardless of the breakout time, the chances of the international community learning about it earlier are much higher. Further, the framework agrees to give inspectors access to suspicious sites or locations where a covert site might be, with no restrictions.
Secondly, the language used in the inspections and access section of the JCPOA means that access to Iran’s nuclear facilities can be conducted at the IAEA’s whim, denying Iran the ability to simply move a weapons program around scheduled inspections. Scheduled inspections are how Israel hid it’s nuclear weapons program in the 60’s, and likely part of how Iran tried to hid it’s program circa 2006. The JCPOA uses the phrase “Inspectors will have continuous surveillance…” which to me indicates that the IAEA cannot be denied access to centrifuges, which allows verification of the restrictions placed on centrifuge use. The continuous surveillance stipulation also applies to the entire centrifuge manufacturing base, as well as all centrifuges removed from enrichment facilities. What that tells me is that there is significant monitoring on Iran’s enrichment capabilities, meaning that regardless of the breakout time, the chances of the international community learning about it earlier are much higher. Further, the framework agrees to give inspectors access to suspicious sites or locations where a covert site might be, with no restrictions.
Thirdly, from a military standpoint, the JCPOA also proposes removal of all enrichment equipment from the Qom (Fordow) enrichment facility. This was the covert facility that was publicly revealed in 2009, and was the site for the higher enrichment of uranium (up to 19.75%). [3] Literally built under a mountain, Fordow represented a significantly harder target than most of the other nuclear facilities in Iran. Moving enrichment from Fordow makes the program far more vulnerable to a military strike.
Finally, the framework’s plan for removal of sanctions is extremely cautious. The removal of sanctions requires the IAEA to first have validated that Iran has taken the key nuclear-related steps. The US sanctions will be lifted but not removed, allowing them to “snap-back” in the event of Iranian non-compliance. UNSC sanctions will be removed, but other UN restrictions will be moved into a new UNSC resolution to include the same transparency and technology transfer measures. From the US side, the sanctions placed on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses and ballistic missiles will remain in place, and there is no guarantee that the US will not add more (although that would probably be non-conductive to Iran agreeing to this…).
I’m not sure where the controversy on this framework comes from. The only alternatives I’ve seen have been Israel’s insistence on Iran’s complete capitulation (clearly forgetting the NPT exists), or people like John Bolton insisting that bombing Iran would be a walk in the park (I beg to differ [4]). Provided the final agreement does not alter the agreed-upon technology limits and inspection authorization too much, this deal is a phenomenal win for the west. It will cripple Iran’s ability to enrich uranium to weapons grade, and provide robust surveillance for at least the next quarter-century. If successful, it will avert a nuclear arms race in the gulf region and successfully preserve the global non-proliferation regime.
Finally, the framework’s plan for removal of sanctions is extremely cautious. The removal of sanctions requires the IAEA to first have validated that Iran has taken the key nuclear-related steps. The US sanctions will be lifted but not removed, allowing them to “snap-back” in the event of Iranian non-compliance. UNSC sanctions will be removed, but other UN restrictions will be moved into a new UNSC resolution to include the same transparency and technology transfer measures. From the US side, the sanctions placed on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses and ballistic missiles will remain in place, and there is no guarantee that the US will not add more (although that would probably be non-conductive to Iran agreeing to this…).
I’m not sure where the controversy on this framework comes from. The only alternatives I’ve seen have been Israel’s insistence on Iran’s complete capitulation (clearly forgetting the NPT exists), or people like John Bolton insisting that bombing Iran would be a walk in the park (I beg to differ [4]). Provided the final agreement does not alter the agreed-upon technology limits and inspection authorization too much, this deal is a phenomenal win for the west. It will cripple Iran’s ability to enrich uranium to weapons grade, and provide robust surveillance for at least the next quarter-century. If successful, it will avert a nuclear arms race in the gulf region and successfully preserve the global non-proliferation regime.
[2] http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/IR1_Centrifuge_Performance_18October2011.pdf
