F-35 Close Air Support

By: A snarky college student who plays far too much Command

It’s worth noting that I have no military experience what-so-ever and this commentary is simply me rambling about what I see as a dumb reaction on the part of many. I’ll try and keep everything sourced as best I can, and I am always open to corrections.

So I have a simulator called Command: Modern Air Naval Operations, which has been described by the US Naval Institute as “near accurate model of hypothetical war with China as can be had using unclassified means”. The sim covers far more than China, and you could probably argue that it is a great model for any conflict. As anyone who plays it will tell you, F-35’s are pretty awesome.

Wait, what?

Yep, F-35’s are incredible force multipliers as modeled in the simulator, and that’s with unclassified documentation.

But the F-35 can’t accelerate!

It keeps up with most 4th gen aircraft.

It can’t turn!

See above.

VHF Radars can detect it!

Well, they can detect it, but VHF radars simply can’t generate a fire-control quality track, due to the wavelengths. So REDFOR might know where the F-35 is, but if they can’t put weapons on it, the kill chain is broken, and stealth has served it’s purpose.

It can’t do CAS!

And here’s what I want to address most in depth.

There seems to be a huge debate over whether or not the A-10 can be effectively replaced by “fast-movers” such as the F-35 in the future. One camp seems to side with the current Department of Defense administration in agreeing that it’s time to move toward more multi-mission platforms. The opposing camp seems to be mostly dedicated to keeping the A-10 in service for a variety of reasons. Some of those reasons seem to be nostalgic (Remember when F-14’s got parked back in 2005?), and others seem to come from infantrymen arguing that the A-10 is the CAS aircraft (Although when retired flag officers dispute that, I’ll take it with a grain of salt). Others still base it on the technical rigors of the CAS mission, and that’s what I want to talk about (Since, you know, sources).

I have seen it argued that the A-10 is a vastly more survivable airplane, due to it’s ability to take an exceptionally large amount of battle damage. [Comments][2][3] This is actually one of the best features of the A-10, especially when operating in a low-threat environment such as our current conflicts in the Middle East and Afghanistan. In these environments, the biggest threats have generally been scattered MANPADs and possibly some AAA emplacements/vehicles. In the role the A-10 was designed for, killing Soviet tanks in Germany, in a full scale war it was expected that over 2 weeks the A-10 fleet would be basically eliminated. [4] While the Warthog would account for a massive chunk of a Soviet Armored invasion, the planes and pilots would take grievous losses. This threat assessment also predates the development of more advanced SAMs (SA-15/-16/-17/-19) that would move with an armored column. It also predates the widespread availability of Look-Down/Shoot-Down radars (The Su-27/MiG-31 were mostly used by PVO in the 1980’s, and the early versions of the MiG-29 had terrible low altitude radar performance [5]). It can therefore be assumed that, in an open conflict with a near-peer foe (Russia or PRC), the A-10 would take the same, if not heavier losses.

The extent of these losses likely results from the A-10’s expected mission profile. It was expected to be low, slow (relatively) and over the FEBA for most of its mission. This profile results in significant exposure to ground fire. The A-10 was built to survive (somewhat) in this environment, and it is able to shrug off a significant amount of AAA and make it home after taking a MANPAD. These are features that the F-35 lacks. However, I would argue that in a current near-peer threat environment, if a CAS aircraft is exposed to the point where REDFOR can put weapons on it, it will rapidly exceed the A-10’s ability to receive damage. In these cases, it is best to reduce exposure time to an absolute minimum. As noted by Caygill, it has been shown that when dealing with SHORAD, the best combination is high speed combined with low altitude [6, p. 86]. This is the case for the idea of “one pass and haul ass” – put weapons on target and escape to preserve the platform for future strikes.

There is a significant problem with operating at high speed and low altitude, and that is one of target acquisition. When flying, it can sometimes be hard to pick up point targets when flying a Cessna 172 at 100 knots as opposed to flying a fighter at 400 knots at <500 feet. For operations in low-threat environments, the A-10 has an advantage in that it can fly low and slow(er) and do so for longer than any other fixed-wing CAS aircraft. This will change with the introduction of the F-35 and it’s Electro Optical Targeting System/Distributed Aperture System (EOTS/DAS). Recent trials by the USAF Air Warfare Center have shown that because the F-35 has the ability to acquire and put weapons on targets in a time frame that exceeds 4th generation fighters by minutes. [7] That may not sound like much, but when bullets are flying, that’s a significant amount of time. The ability of the F-35 to integrated multiple sources of information will likely also reduce the number of Blue-on-Blue incidents, as the F-35 pilots will have greater information as to the location of friendly forces. Most unclassified info seems to indicate that the F-35 should be able to detect and identify ground targets with an unparalleled efficiency; interviews with General Hostage (Head of ACC) and videos put out by contractors tell a story of being able to see, well, everything. [8] This gives the F-35 the ability to effectively execute “one pass and haul ass” against point targets/vehicles, effectively giving it the best of both worlds.

The F-35’s armament in these situations isn’t shabby either. As suggested by the Air Warfare Center, on the first day of the war, the F-35 would want to preserve it’s LO features and would be restricted to internal carriage of munitions. [7] Upon its entry into service, the GBU-53 Small Diameter Bomb II will offer an anti-armor weapon that can be carried internally in operationally significant numbers. The F-35 can carry 8 GBU-53’s internally, giving it a respectable load while maintaining stealth and maintaining stand-off distance to minimize exposure to REDFOR air defenses. [9] For international operators, the Brimstone II missile will also offer similar capabilities (with fewer seeker options). The F-35 likely will not ever have the ability the A-10 does to rapidly return to a target area, however, meaning that overall the number of weapons the same number of airplanes can put on target is lower for the F-35. Since I don’t have access to studies that evaluate the survivability of the F-35, I can’t take a guess as to a project loss rate to determine if fewer sorties over a longer time balances out with more sorties over a shorter time.

Loiter time is another area where the A-10 reportedly has a massive advantage over the F-35 in any kind of CAS scenario. The A-10, as per the unclassified flight manual, will not have more than an hour of combat time after a 150 nm transit. For loiter time at 15,000 feet, it could theoretically about 2 and a half hours of endurance. [10] For the F-35, we don’t have unclassified flight performance data, but we do know it’s listed combat radius (~600 nm) and can make a decent guess as to it’s cruise speed (450 knots). [11] That gives a best guess as to about 1.5 hours out and back, for 3 hours of total mission fuel with reserves. The F-35 can then theoretically make the same 150 nm transit in 20 minutes, leaving it 2 hours and 40 minutes of mission fuel, over the same target! As you extend the operating radius further out, the time overhead will decrease, and I can only guess that because F-35 missions are supposed to take place further from the FEBA, the listed loiter time is lower, leading to the confusion. It’s generally forgotten that the F-35 can carry a lot of internal fuel (more than double the F-16). [12]

To deal with low-intensity operations like those of the past decade, the most cost effective method will likely be to transition towards some kind of combined ISR/Light Attack asset. This could either take the place of use of unmanned assets in a more tactical role or to make more use of armed turboprops. For light attack, the Embraer Super Tucano or Pilatus PC-21 are frequently mentioned, yet there is little chance the US military will purchase either for this role. The USMC has recently begun placing Griffin missiles in the rear of some of it’s C-130s to provide a persistent light attack platform.

To wrap it up, I want to end with what I consider the best overall argument that the F-35 can probably do CAS fairly well; the fact that the USMC is still in favor of the program. The Marines, in general, are the service that seems to be the most about combined arms in direct support of ground forces. They generally seem to be positive about how successful the F-35B will be at replacing the AV-8B. The Harrier has an unparalleled ability to take off from forward bases, attack targets, rearm, and then hit targets again, and again, and again. If the Harrier can be replaced, the CAS mission can clearly be covered, since there is no other way to describe the Harrier’s mission.


[2] http://breakingdefense.com/2014/11/ayotte-to-air-force-f-35s-mechanics-shortage-false-choice/

[3] http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/lists/posts/post.aspx?ID=1570

[4] http://www.warisboring.com/2013/01/21/life-expectancy-of-a-cold-war-a-10-pilot/

[5] http://toad-design.com/migalley/index.php/jet-aircraft/mig29/mig29-n019-radar/

[6] Flying the Buccaneer, Peter Caygill, 2008

[7] http://intercepts.defensenews.com/2014/12/a-look-at-f-35-close-air-support-tactics-development/

[8] http://breakingdefense.com/2014/06/a-gods-eye-view-of-the-battlefield-gen-hostage-on-the-f-35/

[9] http://www.airforce-technology.com/news/newsraytheon-small-diameter-bomb-ii-usaf

[10] http://www.avialogs.com/viewer/avialogs-documentviewer.php?id=3298

[11] http://defensetech.org/2011/05/13/f-35a-combat-radius-fails-to-meet-minimum-requirement/

[12] http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/22/F-35_A_B_C_Config.png/800px-F-35_A_B_C_Config.png