More Iran

This is just a short bit on the mainstream criticism of the recent Iranian nuclear deal. Most of the points I raised several months ago are still valid, and I won’t be bringing them back up.

As President Obama touched on in his Q&A on Wednesday; most of the critics do not seem to be taking a long-term view of these negotiations or the deal. Those that can see past their own egos are approaching the situation from a view that Iran will act in a similar fashion to the DPRK and renege on its agreements as soon as it has received some minor benefit. My assessment (and apparently that of the rest of the western world), is that Iran will act rationally.

The Iranian government has every reason to wish to interact with the rest of the world in a positive economic fashion. Iran has considerable mineral/oil wealth, as well as a robust technology industry [1]. Because a significant portion of the Iranian economy depends on being able to interact with the rest of the world, the international sanctions placed on them were particularly effective. Unlike the DPRK, where isolation is the status quo, the Iranian people rejected the hardliners and elected Rowhani, who campaigned on fixing the economy through negotiation to remove sanctions. The Iranian people place the blame for the sanctions and economic damage not on the west, but on the actions of their government, and the election results showed that. Barring a dramatic shift in that attitude, there is no logical reason for a moderate president (or a supreme leader who wishes to stay in power) to act irrationally after the agreement is in place.

There has been some legitimate criticism based on the vague wording of the final agreement; the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) [a] has raised concerns that the Iranians might be able to hold on to some of their LEU stockpile by holding it in oxides. [2] This would fundamentally change the agreement, which is based on Iran holding 300 kg of LEU (barely a 3^rd of a bomb). As I read their logic, this comes from a hypothetical bending of the agreement to avoid declaring Iranian non-compliance after technical difficulties. While this is a bit of a leap, ISIS certainly has the credentials to make that leap, and their logic has been backed by other nuclear policy experts. [3]

This puts us in a situation where there are technical points and counterpoints; for example, does the inspection regime protect from Iran holding/using a larger stockpile? Is Kuperman right in asserting that the Iranians only need 8kg of WGU to make a warhead? These are questions that need to be discussed and answered as congress prepares to vote on the agreement; however I have yet to see a single critic or reporter raise these points.

There are several possibilities for why it hasn’t been brought up. One is that most of the information the US has on Iran’s actual ability to convert Uranium oxides into LEU/WGU is highly classified. In preliminary briefings, US Senators and Representatives may have been told as such and are not discussing it publicly. There are some flaws in that scenario, the biggest being hat there are think-tanks writing about the issue, and I was able to do research on the topic, and I don’t have any kind of security clearance. What is most likely the real reason for the lack of discussion is that complex nuclear security issues do not translate well to sound bites.

It’s unfortunate, but I feel that the thought process of most of these politicians is “gee wiz how do I get the most emotional response from the voters? Can I get a more emotional response than Ted Cruz?” [b]. Claiming Armageddon is on the way elicits an emotional response, far more so than any kind of discussion that makes people think about high school chemistry. Problem: you can’t have a serious discussion about nuclear weapons programs without talking about a lot of very advanced chemistry, physics and engineering. Anything else is a silly side-show. The fact that most American (and Israeli) politicians and media outlets seem to insist on running on with said side-show is depressing. Even Obama’s Q&A session was annoyingly simple – plainly dumbed down to make sure nobody felt left behind.

My advice to those involved in the debate would be to avoid that. Don’t dumb down your material to suit the audience. Educate your audience to understand the materiel. This is a complex topic, and it does not get easier simply because you don’t understand it. Forming an opinion on something you don’t understand is dishonest. Legislating on that opinion is plainly irresponsible, and that’s if nuclear weapons aren’t involved.   

[1] http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2012-03/05/iranian-concrete

[2] http://www.isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Controversy_Irans_Newly_Produced_LEU_3Jul2015-final.pdf

[3] http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/23/opinion/the-iran-deals-fatal-flaw.html

[a] Not to be confused with the International Secret Intelligence Service

[b] Was originally Donald Trump, but I really don’t like giving him attention…dammit

A Short Bit on the Iran Deal...

So I finally had a chance to read the full text of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and I’m honestly shocked at how reasonable it is. In retrospect, I wish that I had mocked Netanyahu harder for his reaction to it. The language used, as well as the conditions for sanction removal and the sanctions that will remain in place are heavily slanted towards the West. If Iran agrees to the framework and Congress doesn’t demolish it, Obama may finally have a foreign policy legacy.

First off, reductions in centrifuges and uranium stockpiles are significant. A reduction of 97% of the Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) stockpile to 300kg is a massive reduction, something far greater than I had anticipated. The stockpile size is enough to use for some research, and probably enough to start a civilian program, but not enough to actually develop a nuclear weapons program. The fact that Iran is willing to give up this much surprises me. Furthermore, the reduction in centrifuges is also significant (66%), but what is even more limiting is the restrictions on using only first-generation centrifuges. These first-generation centrifuges (IR-1s) are old, copy-of-Pakistani-copy-of-Dutch designs that are known to have high breakdown rates. In recent years the efficiency of these centrifuges has faltered, with possible reasons ranging from lingering Stuxnet damage to simple age. While the agreed-upon quantity of centrifuges is more than enough to exceed the LEU stockpile limit, it is not enough to create LEU at the rates and quantities required for serious commercial production, let alone a weapons program. [2] If they were using the later-generation centrifuges, this would be a concern, but later sections of the JCPOA provide coverage from this.

Secondly, the language used in the inspections and access section of the JCPOA means that access to Iran’s nuclear facilities can be conducted at the IAEA’s whim, denying Iran the ability to simply move a weapons program around scheduled inspections. Scheduled inspections are how Israel hid it’s nuclear weapons program in the 60’s, and likely part of how Iran tried to hid it’s program circa 2006. The JCPOA uses the phrase “Inspectors will have continuous surveillance…” which to me indicates that the IAEA cannot be denied access to centrifuges, which allows verification of the restrictions placed on centrifuge use. The continuous surveillance stipulation also applies to the entire centrifuge manufacturing base, as well as all centrifuges removed from enrichment facilities. What that tells me is that there is significant monitoring on Iran’s enrichment capabilities, meaning that regardless of the breakout time, the chances of the international community learning about it earlier are much higher. Further, the framework agrees to give inspectors access to suspicious sites or locations where a covert site might be, with no restrictions.

Thirdly, from a military standpoint, the JCPOA also proposes removal of all enrichment equipment from the Qom (Fordow) enrichment facility. This was the covert facility that was publicly revealed in 2009, and was the site for the higher enrichment of uranium (up to 19.75%). [3] Literally built under a mountain, Fordow represented a significantly harder target than most of the other nuclear facilities in Iran. Moving enrichment from Fordow makes the program far more vulnerable to a military strike.

Finally, the framework’s plan for removal of sanctions is extremely cautious. The removal of sanctions requires the IAEA to first have validated that Iran has taken the key nuclear-related steps. The US sanctions will be lifted but not removed, allowing them to “snap-back” in the event of Iranian non-compliance. UNSC sanctions will be removed, but other UN restrictions will be moved into a new UNSC resolution to include the same transparency and technology transfer measures. From the US side, the sanctions placed on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses and ballistic missiles will remain in place, and there is no guarantee that the US will not add more (although that would probably be non-conductive to Iran agreeing to this…).

I’m not sure where the controversy on this framework comes from. The only alternatives I’ve seen have been Israel’s insistence on Iran’s complete capitulation (clearly forgetting the NPT exists), or people like John Bolton insisting that bombing Iran would be a walk in the park (I beg to differ [4]). Provided the final agreement does not alter the agreed-upon technology limits and inspection authorization too much, this deal is a phenomenal win for the west. It will cripple Iran’s ability to enrich uranium to weapons grade, and provide robust surveillance for at least the next quarter-century. If successful, it will avert a nuclear arms race in the gulf region and successfully preserve the global non-proliferation regime.

[1] http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/text-agreement-iran-nuclear-program-30079073?singlePage=true

[2] http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/IR1_Centrifuge_Performance_18October2011.pdf

[3] http://www.isisnucleariran.org/sites/detail/fordow/

[4] http://csis.org/files/publication/120906_Iran_US_Preventive_Strikes.pdf

F-35 Close Air Support

By: A snarky college student who plays far too much Command

It’s worth noting that I have no military experience what-so-ever and this commentary is simply me rambling about what I see as a dumb reaction on the part of many. I’ll try and keep everything sourced as best I can, and I am always open to corrections.

So I have a simulator called Command: Modern Air Naval Operations, which has been described by the US Naval Institute as “near accurate model of hypothetical war with China as can be had using unclassified means”. The sim covers far more than China, and you could probably argue that it is a great model for any conflict. As anyone who plays it will tell you, F-35’s are pretty awesome.

Wait, what?

Yep, F-35’s are incredible force multipliers as modeled in the simulator, and that’s with unclassified documentation.

But the F-35 can’t accelerate!

It keeps up with most 4th gen aircraft.

It can’t turn!

See above.

VHF Radars can detect it!

Well, they can detect it, but VHF radars simply can’t generate a fire-control quality track, due to the wavelengths. So REDFOR might know where the F-35 is, but if they can’t put weapons on it, the kill chain is broken, and stealth has served it’s purpose.

It can’t do CAS!

And here’s what I want to address most in depth.

There seems to be a huge debate over whether or not the A-10 can be effectively replaced by “fast-movers” such as the F-35 in the future. One camp seems to side with the current Department of Defense administration in agreeing that it’s time to move toward more multi-mission platforms. The opposing camp seems to be mostly dedicated to keeping the A-10 in service for a variety of reasons. Some of those reasons seem to be nostalgic (Remember when F-14’s got parked back in 2005?), and others seem to come from infantrymen arguing that the A-10 is the CAS aircraft (Although when retired flag officers dispute that, I’ll take it with a grain of salt). Others still base it on the technical rigors of the CAS mission, and that’s what I want to talk about (Since, you know, sources).

I have seen it argued that the A-10 is a vastly more survivable airplane, due to it’s ability to take an exceptionally large amount of battle damage. [Comments][2][3] This is actually one of the best features of the A-10, especially when operating in a low-threat environment such as our current conflicts in the Middle East and Afghanistan. In these environments, the biggest threats have generally been scattered MANPADs and possibly some AAA emplacements/vehicles. In the role the A-10 was designed for, killing Soviet tanks in Germany, in a full scale war it was expected that over 2 weeks the A-10 fleet would be basically eliminated. [4] While the Warthog would account for a massive chunk of a Soviet Armored invasion, the planes and pilots would take grievous losses. This threat assessment also predates the development of more advanced SAMs (SA-15/-16/-17/-19) that would move with an armored column. It also predates the widespread availability of Look-Down/Shoot-Down radars (The Su-27/MiG-31 were mostly used by PVO in the 1980’s, and the early versions of the MiG-29 had terrible low altitude radar performance [5]). It can therefore be assumed that, in an open conflict with a near-peer foe (Russia or PRC), the A-10 would take the same, if not heavier losses.

The extent of these losses likely results from the A-10’s expected mission profile. It was expected to be low, slow (relatively) and over the FEBA for most of its mission. This profile results in significant exposure to ground fire. The A-10 was built to survive (somewhat) in this environment, and it is able to shrug off a significant amount of AAA and make it home after taking a MANPAD. These are features that the F-35 lacks. However, I would argue that in a current near-peer threat environment, if a CAS aircraft is exposed to the point where REDFOR can put weapons on it, it will rapidly exceed the A-10’s ability to receive damage. In these cases, it is best to reduce exposure time to an absolute minimum. As noted by Caygill, it has been shown that when dealing with SHORAD, the best combination is high speed combined with low altitude [6, p. 86]. This is the case for the idea of “one pass and haul ass” – put weapons on target and escape to preserve the platform for future strikes.

There is a significant problem with operating at high speed and low altitude, and that is one of target acquisition. When flying, it can sometimes be hard to pick up point targets when flying a Cessna 172 at 100 knots as opposed to flying a fighter at 400 knots at <500 feet. For operations in low-threat environments, the A-10 has an advantage in that it can fly low and slow(er) and do so for longer than any other fixed-wing CAS aircraft. This will change with the introduction of the F-35 and it’s Electro Optical Targeting System/Distributed Aperture System (EOTS/DAS). Recent trials by the USAF Air Warfare Center have shown that because the F-35 has the ability to acquire and put weapons on targets in a time frame that exceeds 4th generation fighters by minutes. [7] That may not sound like much, but when bullets are flying, that’s a significant amount of time. The ability of the F-35 to integrated multiple sources of information will likely also reduce the number of Blue-on-Blue incidents, as the F-35 pilots will have greater information as to the location of friendly forces. Most unclassified info seems to indicate that the F-35 should be able to detect and identify ground targets with an unparalleled efficiency; interviews with General Hostage (Head of ACC) and videos put out by contractors tell a story of being able to see, well, everything. [8] This gives the F-35 the ability to effectively execute “one pass and haul ass” against point targets/vehicles, effectively giving it the best of both worlds.

The F-35’s armament in these situations isn’t shabby either. As suggested by the Air Warfare Center, on the first day of the war, the F-35 would want to preserve it’s LO features and would be restricted to internal carriage of munitions. [7] Upon its entry into service, the GBU-53 Small Diameter Bomb II will offer an anti-armor weapon that can be carried internally in operationally significant numbers. The F-35 can carry 8 GBU-53’s internally, giving it a respectable load while maintaining stealth and maintaining stand-off distance to minimize exposure to REDFOR air defenses. [9] For international operators, the Brimstone II missile will also offer similar capabilities (with fewer seeker options). The F-35 likely will not ever have the ability the A-10 does to rapidly return to a target area, however, meaning that overall the number of weapons the same number of airplanes can put on target is lower for the F-35. Since I don’t have access to studies that evaluate the survivability of the F-35, I can’t take a guess as to a project loss rate to determine if fewer sorties over a longer time balances out with more sorties over a shorter time.

Loiter time is another area where the A-10 reportedly has a massive advantage over the F-35 in any kind of CAS scenario. The A-10, as per the unclassified flight manual, will not have more than an hour of combat time after a 150 nm transit. For loiter time at 15,000 feet, it could theoretically about 2 and a half hours of endurance. [10] For the F-35, we don’t have unclassified flight performance data, but we do know it’s listed combat radius (~600 nm) and can make a decent guess as to it’s cruise speed (450 knots). [11] That gives a best guess as to about 1.5 hours out and back, for 3 hours of total mission fuel with reserves. The F-35 can then theoretically make the same 150 nm transit in 20 minutes, leaving it 2 hours and 40 minutes of mission fuel, over the same target! As you extend the operating radius further out, the time overhead will decrease, and I can only guess that because F-35 missions are supposed to take place further from the FEBA, the listed loiter time is lower, leading to the confusion. It’s generally forgotten that the F-35 can carry a lot of internal fuel (more than double the F-16). [12]

To deal with low-intensity operations like those of the past decade, the most cost effective method will likely be to transition towards some kind of combined ISR/Light Attack asset. This could either take the place of use of unmanned assets in a more tactical role or to make more use of armed turboprops. For light attack, the Embraer Super Tucano or Pilatus PC-21 are frequently mentioned, yet there is little chance the US military will purchase either for this role. The USMC has recently begun placing Griffin missiles in the rear of some of it’s C-130s to provide a persistent light attack platform.

To wrap it up, I want to end with what I consider the best overall argument that the F-35 can probably do CAS fairly well; the fact that the USMC is still in favor of the program. The Marines, in general, are the service that seems to be the most about combined arms in direct support of ground forces. They generally seem to be positive about how successful the F-35B will be at replacing the AV-8B. The Harrier has an unparalleled ability to take off from forward bases, attack targets, rearm, and then hit targets again, and again, and again. If the Harrier can be replaced, the CAS mission can clearly be covered, since there is no other way to describe the Harrier’s mission.


[2] http://breakingdefense.com/2014/11/ayotte-to-air-force-f-35s-mechanics-shortage-false-choice/

[3] http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/lists/posts/post.aspx?ID=1570

[4] http://www.warisboring.com/2013/01/21/life-expectancy-of-a-cold-war-a-10-pilot/

[5] http://toad-design.com/migalley/index.php/jet-aircraft/mig29/mig29-n019-radar/

[6] Flying the Buccaneer, Peter Caygill, 2008

[7] http://intercepts.defensenews.com/2014/12/a-look-at-f-35-close-air-support-tactics-development/

[8] http://breakingdefense.com/2014/06/a-gods-eye-view-of-the-battlefield-gen-hostage-on-the-f-35/

[9] http://www.airforce-technology.com/news/newsraytheon-small-diameter-bomb-ii-usaf

[10] http://www.avialogs.com/viewer/avialogs-documentviewer.php?id=3298

[11] http://defensetech.org/2011/05/13/f-35a-combat-radius-fails-to-meet-minimum-requirement/

[12] http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/22/F-35_A_B_C_Config.png/800px-F-35_A_B_C_Config.png

How to Counter ISIL

Much of the news of late has been focusing on President Obama's attempts to build a coalition to "degrade and destroy" ISIL. The news, and the coalition has focused mostly on setting up for a systematic air campaign, ala Operation Allied Force or Northern Watch. While this option may be the most politically tenable option, it is not the way to effectively degrade the influence of ISIL.

The current upper bound for estimates of ISIL's fighters are at 31,500. That might sound like a lot, but it must be taken in the context of how much territory the group controls. The group has effective control/governance of territory from Aleppo, Syria to approximately Baiji and Kirkuk in Iraq, with some control of areas south, near Falluja. This is a distance of almost 400 miles, and when Mosul is counted, ISIL controls almost 8000 square miles of territory. It's not possible to control 8000 square miles with 31000 fighters. The US put 30,000 troops into Baghdad alone in the "surge" in 2007 to bring the area under control. 

To deal with it's comparatively low number of fighters, ISIL has been fighting and exerting control in ways that maximize it's effectiveness across multiple fronts. For starters, with the exception of strategic facilities, ISIL is not stopping to fight. Several months ago, it appeared that Baghdad was on the verge of falling like Saigon (in a rather haunting parallel). However, as soon as ISIL fighters began to reach Shia resistance, they seized an oil refinery, then stopped. They were not willing to take territory they would have to fight to take, then fight to hold. Forces very quickly appeared further to the west in Iraq, seizing more towns where there was comparatively little resistance. This is textbook maneuver warfare. Don't worry about your flanks, don't stop to fight, just advance until you can't, then find somewhere else to advance. The way ISIL practices this adds to the lists of places it has "conquered" and increases its ability to instill fear and "shock and awe". Furthermore, in order to reduce the area it must control, ISIL has been largely ignoring sparsely populated areas, instead focusing on major population centers and the supply lines (LOS) and lines of communication (LOC) between them. 

Finally, to effectively control the territory it holds, ISIL is using local militias. This is where the fight gets political. These Sunni militias have felt disenfranchised and persecuted by the central government. While they may dislike ISIL and their interpretation of Islam, they do not feel persecuted simply for being Sunni. In general, Arabs tend to be pragmatic to a fault. In this case, the citizens of northern Iraq simply want to live their lives, with a minimum of bloodshed/violence. They are willing to pick the lesser of two evils, or in this case, the victor of two evils over what they would ideally want. At this point, ISIL looks to be the victor, so the Iraqi's are willing to tolerate/support them for their own sake. As time goes on, they may begin to split from ISIL and break back down into tribal militias, however, that will take several years. Local frustration with Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) caused a similar effect post-US invasion. AQI's violence towards Shia Muslims and marriage of foreign fighters to Iraqi girls (breaking tribal/family structures) eventually cumulated in "the awakening" where the US and the Baghdad government were able to shift Sunni militias over to fight on the government's side. This severely limited the ability of AQI to communicate and maneuver, both of which are critical elements for an insurgency to survive. However, this process will take a long time and cannot be used in the short run, unless it is accelerated by making the government seem more attractive. 

Keeping this in mind, the focus on airstrikes must be eliminated. Targeted strikes must be only a small component of comprehensive strategy to degrade ISIL. At this point, while the group likes to label itself as "the Islamic State" it is still an insurgency and must be fought as such. This means that air strikes alone will not be effective, as the fighters will simply melt away into the population and will gain more recruits in the fight that increasingly becomes anti-west/anti-US. This draws attention away from ISIL's violence and total intolerance all other religions/creeds and reduces the chances of completing the stated objective of degrading ISIL. The strategy of the day must focus on turning the local population against ISIL, and showing that the central government can and will win the fight against ISIL and will stay as a positive influence after ISIL has been driven out.

Unfortunately for the US, the single most important part of this campaign hinges on the ability of the Baghdad government becoming more inclusive. Bombings of civilian areas must stop, completely. Indiscriminate detentions must also be heavily reduced, even if there is an increase in bombings/attacks on civilians. Shia outlaws must also be punished with the same severity as Sunnis. For the newly-formed coalition, the composition of the air campaign must be changed dramatically. The number of humanitarian flights so far has been just enough to make the plight of the Yazidis disappear from CNN. Humanitarian flights should be the primary objective the campaign; most combat flights should be to support these supply drops. The population must know that the US (and the government) is there as support, and should not be seen as an ominous force overhead that occasionally blows up buildings. Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR)  flights must also be increased, and this means drones, and more drones. Heavy use of ISR and and highly targeted strikes is what allowed the US to decimate AQI during the occupation, and ISIL will be just as vulnerable. "Signature" strikes should be done away with, and no bomb should come off an aircraft unless it is known exactly who it is going to blow up. Targets should be limited to ISIL upper-echelon leadership, LOS and LOC interdiction, as well as ISIL militants that are in contact with or moving to engage friendly forces/civilians. Shows of force should be almost regular, simply to enforce a sense of persistence on the local population; as referenced above, the US/Government needs to be seen as a force that will be there even when ISIL is not. 

The current political climate in the US appears to shy away from a counter-insurgency campaign in favor of dropping a few bombs. This aversion to an involved fight will allow ISIL to continue to exist, torment civilian populations and remain a thorn in the US's side. It must be dealt with strongly, but the strength must come from emphasizing an ideology counter to ISILs, not from the size of warheads.

References:

Freedberg Jr., S., & Clark, C. (2014, September 10). ISIS Force Remains Low-Tech: DoD Data. Retrieved September 16, 2014, from http://breakingdefense.com/2014/09/isis-force-remains-low-tech-dod-data/


How ISIS Works. (2014, September 15). Retrieved September 16, 2014, from http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/09/16/world/middleeast/how-isis-works.html
Junger, S. (2010). War. New York: Twelve.

McChrystal, S. (2013). My share of the task: A memoir. New York: Portfolio/Penguin.

Mitt Romney: The need for a mighty US military (and my inability to stop making stupid comparisons)

By: a snarky, liberal college student

Mitt Romney continues to make the same stupid comparisons that led to, in my humble opinion, the 3rd best debate retort of all time.




Romney recently wrote an OpEd piece that appeared in the Washington Post arguing for increased military spending, and in a few spots calls for reduced spending on domestic things, like healthcare and benefits. All in all, its a fairly generic, establishment GOP essay. He even raises several valid concerns; the rate at which the PRC is expanding their military forces and the rising tension with Russia. Yet, despite a multitude of of valid reasons to emphasize a need to expand our military, or emphasize it's size, he's back to the same comparisons to the early 20th century, which completely neglect changes in technology and geopolitics. Or real numbers. The actual quote is:

"...the Army is on track to be the size it was in 1940, the Navy to be the size it was in 1917, the Air Force to be smaller than in 1947 and our nuclear arsenal to be no larger than it was under President Harry S. Truman."

Lets break this down and see what we can do with it:

"...the Army is on track to be the size it was in 1940..."

So, looking at this piece, you can tell what the connotations are. Everybody knows that the US was woefully underprepared at the start of WWII, and it was only though hard work and capitalism that we built up our military forces to defeat the Japanese and the Germans. (Little bit of sarcasm here)

I decided to look up just how badly US troop numbers had fallen over time. I found a table of numbers from 1940 to 2011, with some gaps. Let's look at the graph below.

So, for reference, in 1940, the US had ~270,000 active duty in the army. That huge spike is from WWII, and following that there are minor spikes for the Korean and Vietnam wars, followed by returns to normalcy. The end of the cold war saw a reduction of about 33% from ~750,000 active duty to ~500,000 active duty, which has remained fairly constant for the past 2 decades or so. So, as Romney is implying, a cut back to 270,000 active duty would be a major issue and would represent a massive reduction in US military power, if it was happening.
That's right, it's not happening. The best numbers I have found indicate that the Army's target for 2017 troop numbers are ~490,000 active duty, down from about 520,000 at present. So yes, cuts are happening, but they are about in line with the average over the past 20 years. Considering the US military is working to draw down from a decade long war, the defense cuts we are going through are actually fairly minor, when compared to those that followed Vietnam and Korea.

"...the Navy to be the size it was in 1917..."

That would mean that the US Navy had shrunk to the size it was when the Ottoman Empire still existed. For the numbers on this, I'm not going to be making my own graph, since the US Navy actually has a series of wonderfully annotated tables describing force levels on their website. As the Navy charts show, in 1917 the US Navy had 342 total ships with 160 surface combatants. The US Navy presently has 290 active ships (as per USN website), so the factoid is true.

The counter to this point is two-fold. For starters, while the USN only has ~115 surface combatants (less than 1917), there are currently 72 submarines in service, pushing the number of major combatants in service up to 187, about the same as the first year of WWI. Furthermore, there's a bigger point to be made, which is the USN has been this size since 2000. Throughout the entire Bush administration the shipbuilding plans called for under 325 ships in the navy, as per the CRS. This trend has continued, and I doubt it will change. As President Obama very condescendingly put it, the Naval force structure has changed such that there is vastly more capability available than there was throughout even WWII, when US Naval ship numbers peaked.

"...the Air Force to be smaller than in 1947..."

Basically, the Air Force would be smaller than when it was founded. This has also been true for the past 20 years or so. This has come as a result of draw downs at the end of the Cold War, increasing capability (cost) of existing airframes and a larger portion of the defense budget going to C3, ISR and space systems. Even 20 years ago, the US didn't have the ability to keep an ISR asset on a target continuously, but today it can do that for multiple targets in disparate areas of the globe. There are further reductions in maned aircraft planned, which make for good talking points, however, they do not reflect that the nature of conflicts has changed, and in many cases there are other platforms that can complete certain jobs better across a wider range of environments. However, I will grant the Governor this point, although he is a few years late to be making it and it is in the wrong tense.

"...and our nuclear arsenal to be no larger than it was under President Harry S. Truman."

I'm fairly certain this statement comes from a misreading of the New START treaty. New START limits countries to 1550 deployed weapons at any time, with no restriction on number of stockpiled warheads. When Truman left office in 1953, the US had 1,486 nuclear warheads of all types, not just deploy-able ones. Referencing raw numbers also underestimates the destructive power of today's nuclear weapons. The biggest nuclear weapon available in 1953 had a yield of 160 kt, compared to high yields of up to 475 kt today. Accuracy has also vastly improved, from 2000' on a B-29 (nowhere near accurate enough for a counterforce strike) to about 300' for modern ICBMs. This means that while the warhead numbers might be close, compared to the 1950's, the US can put far more destructive power on targets today.

All in all, with the exception of the piece about the Army, the Governor is using easy numbers to make political points. These numbers do not reflect the reality of the situation, but they do sound good, and I'm sure they'll get lots of air time on Fox News and the Sunday talk shows. As always, if anyone has better sources or different information, I'd love to hear it.

Hi.

I'm a student at a major US university, studying to be a commercial pilot. No, not Riddle. This blog is me rambling about politics, the aviation industry, flying, and really anything else that comes to mind. In addition to new things, I also plan on posting older things that I have written that fit the scope of this space.

-j