Much of the news of late has been focusing on President Obama's attempts to build a coalition to "degrade and destroy" ISIL. The news, and the coalition has focused mostly on setting up for a systematic air campaign, ala Operation Allied Force or Northern Watch. While this option may be the most politically tenable option, it is not the way to effectively degrade the influence of ISIL.
The current upper bound for estimates of ISIL's fighters are at 31,500. That might sound like a lot, but it must be taken in the context of how much territory the group controls. The group has effective control/governance of territory from Aleppo, Syria to approximately Baiji and Kirkuk in Iraq, with some control of areas south, near Falluja. This is a distance of almost 400 miles, and when Mosul is counted, ISIL controls almost 8000 square miles of territory. It's not possible to control 8000 square miles with 31000 fighters. The US put 30,000 troops into Baghdad alone in the "surge" in 2007 to bring the area under control.
To deal with it's comparatively low number of fighters, ISIL has been fighting and exerting control in ways that maximize it's effectiveness across multiple fronts. For starters, with the exception of strategic facilities, ISIL is not stopping to fight. Several months ago, it appeared that Baghdad was on the verge of falling like Saigon (in a rather haunting parallel). However, as soon as ISIL fighters began to reach Shia resistance, they seized an oil refinery, then stopped. They were not willing to take territory they would have to fight to take, then fight to hold. Forces very quickly appeared further to the west in Iraq, seizing more towns where there was comparatively little resistance. This is textbook maneuver warfare. Don't worry about your flanks, don't stop to fight, just advance until you can't, then find somewhere else to advance. The way ISIL practices this adds to the lists of places it has "conquered" and increases its ability to instill fear and "shock and awe". Furthermore, in order to reduce the area it must control, ISIL has been largely ignoring sparsely populated areas, instead focusing on major population centers and the supply lines (LOS) and lines of communication (LOC) between them.
Finally, to effectively control the territory it holds, ISIL is using local militias. This is where the fight gets political. These Sunni militias have felt disenfranchised and persecuted by the central government. While they may dislike ISIL and their interpretation of Islam, they do not feel persecuted simply for being Sunni. In general, Arabs tend to be pragmatic to a fault. In this case, the citizens of northern Iraq simply want to live their lives, with a minimum of bloodshed/violence. They are willing to pick the lesser of two evils, or in this case, the victor of two evils over what they would ideally want. At this point, ISIL looks to be the victor, so the Iraqi's are willing to tolerate/support them for their own sake. As time goes on, they may begin to split from ISIL and break back down into tribal militias, however, that will take several years. Local frustration with Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) caused a similar effect post-US invasion. AQI's violence towards Shia Muslims and marriage of foreign fighters to Iraqi girls (breaking tribal/family structures) eventually cumulated in "the awakening" where the US and the Baghdad government were able to shift Sunni militias over to fight on the government's side. This severely limited the ability of AQI to communicate and maneuver, both of which are critical elements for an insurgency to survive. However, this process will take a long time and cannot be used in the short run, unless it is accelerated by making the government seem more attractive.
Keeping this in mind, the focus on airstrikes must be eliminated. Targeted strikes must be only a small component of comprehensive strategy to degrade ISIL. At this point, while the group likes to label itself as "the Islamic State" it is still an insurgency and must be fought as such. This means that air strikes alone will not be effective, as the fighters will simply melt away into the population and will gain more recruits in the fight that increasingly becomes anti-west/anti-US. This draws attention away from ISIL's violence and total intolerance all other religions/creeds and reduces the chances of completing the stated objective of degrading ISIL. The strategy of the day must focus on turning the local population against ISIL, and showing that the central government can and will win the fight against ISIL and will stay as a positive influence after ISIL has been driven out.
Unfortunately for the US, the single most important part of this campaign hinges on the ability of the Baghdad government becoming more inclusive. Bombings of civilian areas must stop, completely. Indiscriminate detentions must also be heavily reduced, even if there is an increase in bombings/attacks on civilians. Shia outlaws must also be punished with the same severity as Sunnis. For the newly-formed coalition, the composition of the air campaign must be changed dramatically. The number of humanitarian flights so far has been just enough to make the plight of the Yazidis disappear from CNN. Humanitarian flights should be the primary objective the campaign; most combat flights should be to support these supply drops. The population must know that the US (and the government) is there as support, and should not be seen as an ominous force overhead that occasionally blows up buildings. Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) flights must also be increased, and this means drones, and more drones. Heavy use of ISR and and highly targeted strikes is what allowed the US to decimate AQI during the occupation, and ISIL will be just as vulnerable. "Signature" strikes should be done away with, and no bomb should come off an aircraft unless it is known exactly who it is going to blow up. Targets should be limited to ISIL upper-echelon leadership, LOS and LOC interdiction, as well as ISIL militants that are in contact with or moving to engage friendly forces/civilians. Shows of force should be almost regular, simply to enforce a sense of persistence on the local population; as referenced above, the US/Government needs to be seen as a force that will be there even when ISIL is not.
The current political climate in the US appears to shy away from a counter-insurgency campaign in favor of dropping a few bombs. This aversion to an involved fight will allow ISIL to continue to exist, torment civilian populations and remain a thorn in the US's side. It must be dealt with strongly, but the strength must come from emphasizing an ideology counter to ISILs, not from the size of warheads.
References:
Freedberg Jr., S., & Clark, C. (2014, September 10). ISIS Force Remains Low-Tech: DoD Data. Retrieved September 16, 2014, from http://breakingdefense.com/2014/09/isis-force-remains-low-tech-dod-data/
How ISIS Works. (2014, September 15). Retrieved September 16, 2014, from http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/09/16/world/middleeast/how-isis-works.html
Junger, S. (2010). War. New York: Twelve.
McChrystal, S. (2013). My share of the task: A memoir. New York: Portfolio/Penguin.
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